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Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the
University of California and its Implications
BRIAN WOLFMAN *
INTRODUCTION
In 2012, the Obama Administration’s Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) created the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
program, or DACA. 1 DACA authorized certain undocumented people who
arrived in the United States as children to apply for a two-year forbearance
of removal from the United States (and eventually work authorization and
various benefits, such as Social Security benefits). 2 DACA was a significant
program—about 700,000 children took advantage of it—yet it was
implemented through a DHS memorandum, not through rulemaking or
another process that would allow public comment or public agency
deliberation. 3
The Obama Administration later sought both to expand DACA and to
create a separate program, the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans
and Lawful Permanent Residents, or DAPA. 4 DAPA would have made
another 4.3 million people eligible for the same forbearance and benefits
available under DACA. 5
Twenty-six states obtained a nationwide preliminary injunction barring
both the DACA expansion and DAPA. The injunction was upheld by the
Fifth Circuit on the ground that the programs violated the federal
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1
Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t Homeland Sec., to David V.
Aguilar, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., et al., Exercising Prosecutorial
Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children (June
15, 2012), https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretionindividuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf [https://perma.cc/CJ4M-P4CL] [hereinafter
Memorandum from Janet Napolitano].
2
DHS v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1901‒02 (2020).
3
Id. at 1901; see 5 U.S.C. § 553 (rulemaking provisions of the Administrative Procedure
Act).
4
Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to León
Rodríguez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., et al., Exercising Prosecutorial
Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children and
with
Respect
to
Certain
Individuals
who
Are
the
Parents
of
U.S. Citizens or Permanent Residents (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/f
iles/publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_action_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/REN2GMQ8].
5
See Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1902.
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Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). 6 The Supreme Court affirmed by
an equally divided vote. 7 Thus, DACA expansion and DAPA were gone.
Enter the Trump Administration, which did two things. First, it
formally rescinded DAPA, which (as just explained) had been enjoined
before it went into effect. 8 Among the Trump Administration’s reasons for
rescinding DAPA were its asserted legal flaws and the administration’s new
immigration enforcement priorities. 9 Second, the Attorney General wrote a
letter to Acting Secretary of Homeland Security Elaine Duke advising her
to rescind DACA because it had the same legal flaws as DAPA. 10 The next
day, Duke agreed with that advice in a memorandum—again, just like the
Obama Administration, not through rulemaking. 11 Considering the legal
rulings that led to DAPA’s demise, Duke decided to terminate DACA with
a phase-out. 12 She explained that DHS would no longer accept new
applications but that existing DACA recipients whose benefits were set to
expire within six months could apply for a two-year renewal. 13 For all other
DACA recipients, previous grants of relief would expire on their own terms
with no chance for renewal. 14
I. HISTORY OF THE DACA LITIGATION
Plaintiff groups sued in three different district courts, 15 claiming that
DACA’s rescission was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) and violated the equal-protection guarantee of the
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 16 All three district courts rejected
Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 179–86 (5th Cir. 2015).
United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271, 2272 (2016) (per curiam).
8
Memorandum from John F. Kelly, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Kevin K.
McAleenan, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., et al., Rescission of November
20, 2014 Memorandum Providing for Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and
Lawful Permanent Residents (“DAPA”) (June 15, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/
default/files/publications/DAPA%20Cancellation%20Memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/AC2H
-W9CD].
9
See id. at 3.
10
Letter from Jefferson B. Sessions III, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., to Elaine C. Duke,
Acting Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Sept. 4, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/
default/files/publications/17_0904_DOJ_AG-letter-DACA.pdf [https://perma.cc/X4QVJBAP].
11
Memorandum from Elaine C. Duke, Acting Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to
James W. McCament, Acting Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., et al., Recission of
the June 15, 2012 Memorandum Entitled “Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with
Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children” (Sept. 5, 2017),
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/09/05/memorandum-rescission-daca [https://perma.cc/
UYM3-QQK9].
12
See id.
13
See id.
14
See id.
15
DHS v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1903 (2020).
16
Id. The focus of this Essay is the administrative challenge to the rescission. The equalprotection argument—that DACA’s rescission was borne of racial and ethnic animus—
6
7
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the Trump Administration’s arguments that the plaintiffs’ suits were
unreviewable under the APA and that the INA deprived the federal courts
of jurisdiction. 17 Two of the courts then preliminarily enjoined the
rescission under the APA. 18
But the third court—the District Court for the District of Columbia—
took a different and unusual approach. It granted summary judgment to the
plaintiffs on their APA claim but then stayed its order to permit DHS to
reissue its memorandum rescinding DACA with a better explanation about
why DACA was unlawful. 19 Duke’s successor, DHS Secretary Kirstjen
Nielsen, responded to the court’s order by (not surprisingly) declining to
replace Duke’s rescission decision and explaining why she thought Duke
had been right about DACA’s unlawfulness. 20 She also provided several
new justifications for the rescission, including that “any class-based
immigration relief should come from Congress, not through executive nonenforcement” and “the importance of ‘project[ing] a message’ that
immigration laws would be enforced against all classes and categories of
aliens.” 21 The district court concluded that Nielsen’s new reasoning failed
to add meaningfully to Duke’s rationale and so held DACA’s rescission
arbitrary and capricious under the APA. 22 The Supreme Court granted the
Government’s cert petitions from these rulings. It then held, by a five-tofour vote, in an opinion penned by Chief Justice Roberts and joined by the
four “liberals,” that the DACA rescission was arbitrary and capricious. 23
The Trump Administration’s failure to eliminate DACA may have
significant political consequences and surely had momentous consequences
for many of DACA’s hundreds of thousands of beneficiaries. But some
commentators have noted that the Supreme Court’s ruling is not a legal
landmark—instead involving only the application of settled administrativelaw principles discussed further below. 24 I mainly agree with that view.

was rejected by the Supreme Court by an 8-to-1 vote. See id. at 1915–16; see also id. at
1917 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
17
See id. at 1903–04 (majority opinion).
18
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. DHS, 279 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1048 (N.D. Cal. 2018); Vidal
v. Nielsen, 279 F. Supp. 3d 401, 420 (E.D.N.Y. 2018).
19
NAACP v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d 209, 245 (D.D.C. 2018).
20
Memorandum from Kirstjen M. Nielsen, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (June 22,
2018), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/18_0622_S1_Memorandum_
DACA.pdf [https://perma.cc/NJQ6-KBVF].
21
Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1904.
22
NAACP v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 471.
23
Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1910–15.
24
See, e.g., Jaclyn Kelley-Widmer, Opinion, A Dream Deferred, REGUL. REV. (July 20,
2020), https://www.theregreview.org/2020/07/20/kelley-widmer-dream-deferred/ [https://
perma.cc/6A47-HZFN].
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Nonetheless, the decision’s administrative-law holdings are interesting,
and the Court’s ruling contains several “extras”—little nuances that may
affect the law over time and that should interest administrative-law nerds.
II. THE COURT’S FOUR HOLDINGS
The Court’s decision involves four holdings in my view: two about the
federal courts’ authority to consider the challenges to the Trump
Administration’s DACA rescission and two about APA arbitrary-andcapricious review.
First, the Court rejected the Government’s argument that DACA
rescission was unreviewable as “agency action committed to agency
discretion by law” under APA § 701(a)(2). 25 The Court reiterated the APA’s
presumption in favor of judicial review of agency action—as expressed in
decades of the Court’s jurisprudence—and that it reads the § 701(a)(2)
exception “quite narrowly.” 26
The Government argued that DACA was an exercise of enforcement
discretion, and so too must be its rescission, relying on the Court’s famous
decision in Heckler v. Chaney, 27 which had held committed to agency
discretion FDA’s decisions not to take enforcement action against states’
use of unapproved drugs for lethal injection. 28 Heckler viewed agency nonenforcement under § 701(a)(2) as similar to prosecutorial discretion, which
invariably has been viewed as “the special province of the Executive
Branch.” 29 That is, you cannot use the courts to force a prosecutor to
prosecute. 30
The Chief Justice held that Heckler’s unreviewability principle did not
apply to the judicial review sought in the DACA litigation because DACA
was not actually a non-enforcement policy, but really something quite
different: a process through which certain undocumented individuals would
apply for forbearance based on government-issued criteria. 31 That is,
DACA involves an affirmative act of governmental approval rather than a
refusal to act (which is what non-enforcement is all about). The icing on the
Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1905–07; see 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).
See Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1905 (quoting Weyerhaeusur Co. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Serv., 139 S. Ct. 361, 370 (2018)); see also Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 191 (1993)
(reiterating that “§ 701(a)(2) makes it clear that ‘review is not to be had’ in those rare
circumstances where the relevant statute ‘is drawn so that a court would have no
meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion’”).
27
Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1906.
28
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837 (1985).
29
See id. at 832.
30
Cf. Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (“[A] citizen lacks standing to
contest the policies of the prosecuting authority when he himself is neither prosecuted nor
threatened with prosecution.”).
31
See Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1906.
25
26
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cake for the Court was that even if DACA could be viewed as a nonenforcement policy, it was not only a non-enforcement policy because of its
associated benefits—work authorization and Social Security, for instance—
which, the Chief Justice observed, are the types of government benefits that
courts are traditionally called on to protect. 32
Although this holding is not a bombshell, it is not unimportant either. It
further narrows APA § 701(a)(2) or, at the least, emphasizes its narrowness.
Lawyers looking to subject agency policies billed as non-enforcement
policies to judicial review should analogize to the attributes of DACA that
the Court found salient in subjecting it to judicial review.
Second, the Government pointed to two jurisdiction-stripping
provisions of the INA meant to channel review of individual deportation
orders to assert that the courts lacked jurisdiction to review the DACA
rescission. 33 The Court quickly nixed these arguments on textual grounds. 34
These provisions were unrelated to the DACA rescission, 35 which was an
agency policy about the removability of non-citizens generally. 36 The
provisions the Government relied on might strip the courts of jurisdiction if
DACA were rescinded and DHS obtained an order of removal against a
particular person. This holding about jurisdiction is not groundbreaking. It
is of a piece with the Court’s § 701(a)(2) holding and recent immigration
decisions, such as the Court’s recent ruling Nasrallah v. Barr, 37 in which
the Court continues to emphasize the importance of judicial review and the
narrowness of any exceptions to it.
Third, the Court turned to the APA question—whether DHS’s DACA
rescission was arbitrary and capricious—by first discussing where to look
for the agency’s explanation of its decision. 38 Relying on settled law, the
Court decided that the agency could not rely on the post hoc explanation
given by Secretary Nielsen. 39 It is, the Court explained, “a ‘foundational
principle of administrative law’ that judicial review of agency action is
limited to ‘the grounds that the agency invoked when it took the action.’” 40
See id. at 1906–07.
See id. at 1907.
34
See id.
35
See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(b)(9), (g).
36
Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 1.
37
140 S. Ct. 1683, 1691 (2020) (holding that the Immigration and Nationality Act’s bar on
judicial review of final orders of removal does not apply to immigrants’ claims under the
Convention Against Torture); see also Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1062, 1069
(2020) (quoting Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 251 (2010) (holding that the provision of
the Immigration and Nationality Act limiting judicial review to “questions of law” includes
applications of law to settled facts, relying in part on “the presumption favoring judicial
review of administrative action”).
38
Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1907.
39
Id. at 1908.
40
Id. at 1907 (emphasis added) (quoting Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 758 (2015)).
32
33
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If those grounds are inadequate, the Court said, a court can remand for one
of two things. First, the agency may provide “a fuller explanation of the
agency’s reasoning at the time of the agency action.” 41 Second, the agency
can take “new agency action” 42 and, in doing so, “must comply with the
procedural requirements for [that] new agency action.” 43 Nielsen chose the
first route, which meant she could only elaborate on her predecessor’s prior
reasoning but could not engage in post hoc rationalization. 44 Nielsen did,
however, justify her predecessor’s old policy with new reasons—for
instance, terminating DACA to maintain confidence in the rule of law and
to avoid burdensome litigation—which, according to the Chief Justice,
appeared nowhere in the agency’s original justification for the law. 45
In dissent, Justice Kavanaugh suggested that requiring DHS to issue a
new policy via a new rulemaking would be an empty formality leading to
the same result. 46 The Chief Justice disagreed, saying that demanding
contemporaneous explanations for new agency action, allowing the parties
and the public to respond, and providing for orderly judicial review (as
opposed to requiring litigants to chase a moving target) are important
values. 47
In supporting this ruling, Chief Justice Roberts noted the celebrated
dictum of Justice Holmes that the people “must turn square corners when
they deal with the Government,” 48 but then observed that “particularly when
so much is at stake, . . . ‘the Government should turn square corners in
dealing with the people.’” 49 This is the first time the Court turned around
the Holmes aphorism in a majority opinion, and that matters. Though it
should be self-evident that “the Government” exists to serve “the people”—
not the other way around—it apparently wasn’t to Holmes, and the Chief
Justice’s statement forcefully underscores the point. 50
Id. at 1907–08 (quoting Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 654
(1990)).
42
Id. at 1908 (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 201 (1947)).
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
See id.
46
Id. at 1934–35 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
47
Id. at 1909 (majority opinion). The Chief Justice noted as well that the rule against post
hoc rationalizations applies to all agency statements, not just its litigating positions,
rejecting Justice Kavanaugh’s position on that score. Compare id. with id. at 1934
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
48
Id. at 1909 (majority opinion) (citing Rock Island, Ark. & La. R.R. v. United States, 254
U.S. 141, 143 (1920)).
49
Id. (quoting St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208, 229 (1961) (Black, J.,
dissenting)).
50
The Chief Justice’s view may be contagious. Justice Gorsuch recently maintained, in
Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474, 1486 (2021), that “[i]f men must turn square
corners when they deal with the government, it cannot be too much to expect the
government to turn square corners when it deals with them.”
41
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Fourth, the Court turned to the merits of the arbitrary-and-capricious
issue. Here, the Chief Justice rejected DACA rescission, relying on the
Court’s famous air-bag case, Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State
Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co., which held that agency action that fails
to consider “[an] important aspect[] of the problem before [it]” is arbitrary
and capricious. 51
The Court held that DHS had violated the State Farm principle in two
ways. First, recall that DACA had two basic components: benefits, such as
work authorization and forbearance as to deportation. 52 Though DHS had
regarded the illegality of benefits as sufficient to terminate DACA, it had
offered no reason to terminate forbearance and had not even considered
whether forbearance alone could or should be maintained. In short, under
State Farm, DHS needed to consider a forbearance-only policy, including
its legality. 53 That alone was enough, in the Court’s view, to throw out
DACA rescission. 54
But there was more: the agency had not considered reliance interests—
that is, reliance on the Obama-era memorandum establishing DACA. The
Chief Justice, citing the plaintiffs-respondents, noted:
DACA recipients have ‘enrolled in degree programs, embarked on
careers, started businesses, purchased homes, and even married
and had children, all in reliance’ on the DACA program. The
consequences of the rescission . . . would ‘radiate outward’ to
DACA recipients’ families, including their 200,000 U.S.-citizen
children, to the schools where DACA recipients study and teach,
and to the employers who have invested time and money in
training them. 55

The Government did not deny that DHS had ignored reliance interests,
but it—along with Justice Thomas in dissent 56—claimed that this did not
matter because DACA itself conferred no substantive rights and provided
only temporary benefits. The Chief Justice gave that argument the back of
his hand, noting that neither the Government nor Justice Thomas could
muster any authority for their position. 57
The Chief Justice pointed out that if DHS had considered reliance
interests, it might have instituted a longer wind-down period as part of any
Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1910 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).
52
Id. at 1906, 1913.
53
Id. at 1911–13.
54
Id. at 1913.
55
Id. at 1914 (citations omitted).
56
Id. at 1930 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
57
Id. at 1913 (majority opinion).
51
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rescission “based on the need for DACA recipients to reorder their
affairs.” 58
A couple final points. First, as to reliance interests, note that often in
administrative law—and in American law generally—reliance interests
focus on commercial interests. Indeed, the two decisions cited by the Chief
Justice—Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 59 and the Court’s recent
decision in Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro 60—focused on commercial
interests. Yet, in the DACA case, the Chief Justice was principally
concerned with the reliance interests of undocumented immigrants who had
relied on DACA. This concern is a good thing. After all, immigrants,
consumers, workers, students, parents, and public-welfare beneficiaries—
that is, “little guys” of all stripes—rely for their livelihood, health,
education, and economic well-being on the benefits of American law. The
Court’s decision provides a basis for broadening the law’s understanding
that these people, too, possess reliance interests that warrant protection
Second, the difference-maker in this case was the Chief Justice. He took
the traditional view of administrative law that process and regularity matter
and that the ends cannot be justified when the means used for achieving
them are inadequate or irregular. To the dissenters, DACA’s perceived
illegality was all that mattered, and so the means by which its demise was
to be achieved were irrelevant. The traditional view of the administrative
process prevailed, at least for the time being.

Id. at 1914.
517 U.S. 735 (1996).
60
136 S. Ct. 2117 (2018).
58
59

